Shades of Perception- User Factors in Identifying Password Strength by Pittman, Jason M. & Robinson, Nikki
Shades of Perception: User Factors In Identifying Password Strength
Jason M. Pittman1, Nikki Robinson
1 Department of Computer Science, High Point University, High Point NC 
Abstract
Purpose - The purpose of this study was to measure whether participant education, profession, 
and technical skill level exhibited a relationship with identification of password strength.
Design/methodology/approach – Participants reviewed 50 passwords and labeled each as weak 
or strong. A Chi-square test of independence was used to measure relationships between 
education, profession, technical skill level relative to the frequency of weak and strong password 
identification. 
Findings - The results demonstrate significant relationships across all variable combinations 
except for technical skill and strong passwords which demonstrated no relationship. 
Research limitations/implications - This research has three limitations. Data collection was 
dependent upon participant self-reporting and has limited externalized power. Further, the 
instrument was constructed under the assumption that all participants could read English and 
understood the concept of password strength. Finally, we did not control for external tool use 
(i.e., password strength meter).
Practical implications - The results build upon existing literature insofar as the outcomes add to
the collective understanding of user perception of passwords in specific and authentication in 
general. Whereas prior research has explored similar areas, such work has done so by having 
participants create passwords. This work measures perception of pregenerated passwords. The 
results demonstrate a need for further investigation into why users continue to rely on weak 
passwords. 
Originality/value - The originality of this work rests in soliciting a broad spectrum of 
participants and measuring potential correlations between participant education, profession, and 
technical skill level. 
Keywords - Information security, Computer security, Computer Users
Introduction
Password-based authentication is a prominent feature in modern life. Logging into a computer or
application with a password is perhaps the most common event occurring in daily life. It goes 
without saying that much of the security for such systems rests upon passwords. Meanwhile, 
cyberattacks are targeting password authentication as a susceptible link in the defense chain. 
Nefarious actors are finding success with phishing, social engineering, and outright system 
attacks. Unfortunately, two factor authentication methods are not widely used (Mao, Florencio, 
and Herley, 2012). To upgrade to a multi factor authentication system, an organization would 
need to undertake a large-scale engineering effort and completely alter the way users interact 
with systems (Mao, Florencio, and Herley, 2012). As the undertaking of creating a two-factor 
authentication is too great for most organizations, or unavailable to public websites, users must 
continue to use password-based login methods. 
Yet, password authentication has grown on such a scale that users are overburdened cognitively 
(De Joode, 2012). Existing research demonstrates that users maintain approximately 25 total 
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password-protected accounts (Florencio and Herley, 2007; Dhamija and Dusseault, 2008). The 
same research also revealed that users enter a password eight times, on average each day. 
Overall, conventional text-based passwords are insecure (Florencio and Herley, 2007). The 
reasons for this have been well studied and there has been great effort to combat the seemingly 
inherent flaws in conventional password authentication through variations in form and recall 
modality (Jermyn et al. 1999; Brostoff and Sasse, 2000; Jansen, 2003; Wiedenbeck et al., 2005).
Concurrent to the development of alternatives to conventional password schemes, researchers 
have turned to investigating means to increase the strength of text-based passwords. Ur et al. 
(2012) studied 2,931 password creation subjects using 14 different password meters. Their 
findings (2012) suggested more stringent meters led users to create stronger passwords, as well 
as the inclusion of particular visual appearances. Of course, developing alternatives requires 
understanding as many facets of the underlying issues as possible. Accordingly, Ur et al. (2015) 
asked users to create passwords in an attempt to uncover potential patterns in password 
generation. The researchers also interviewed these users and found pervasive misconceptions 
associated with what password creation factors lead to strong or weak passwords. However, we 
feel the literature presupposes that general password users can meaningfully identify such. 
Such misconceptions appear to be prevalent in password meter development communities as 
well. Carnavalet and Mannan (2014) found, “highly inconsistent strength outcomes for the same 
password in different meters, along with examples of many weak passwords being labeled as 
strong or even excellent” (pg. iii). However, the existing literature presupposes that users can 
identify password strength. As Carnavalet and Mannan noted, millions of users use password-
strength checkers on web services that require users to create passwords but the password 
checkers are only partially effective in aiding users to create stronger passwords. Specifically, 
Carnavalet and Mannan (2014) determined inconsistencies in the password checkers may lead 
users to misunderstand the characteristics required in a stronger password.
Based on Ur et al. (2015), it can be inferred that users hold misguided ideas regarding password 
strength in the context of creating passwords. This led us to wonder if an underlying motivation 
for such misunderstanding might be related to the users themselves. That is, apart from the 
inconsistency in password checkers, perhaps users interact with passwords inconsistently. Of 
course, all such speculation presupposes users can differentiate between weak and strong 
passwords to begin with. Following on their prior study, Ur et al. (2016) demonstrated users 
indeed can reliably judge password strength despite not necessarily creating or using strong 
passwords themselves.
Such as disconnect between knowing and action caught our interest. Accordingly, we wondered 
what socioeconomic characteristics, if any, led participants to identify weak and strong password
strengths in a statistically significant manner. Thus, we asked users to rate 50 passwords as either
strong or weak as a means to develop more understanding of how individuals perceive 
passwords. At the same time, we gathered level of education, profession, password usage and 
management, electronic device usage, and self-assessed technology skills, as socioeconomic 
characteristics of interest.
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Background
Characteristics of weak versus strong passwords vary across research even within the same time 
period. This is further confused by variation between password strength visualization tools such 
as found by Salem, Hossain, and Kamala (2008) and Zhang-Kennedy, Chiasson, and Biddle 
(2011). Salem, Hossain, and Kamala (2008) investigated how individuals cannot identify a 
strong password, and further, the word strong is not well defined in context to password strength.
Salem, Hossain, and Kamala (2008) then created a tool to identify password strength based on 
well known password cracking techniques; dictionary attacks, time to crack, and shoulder 
surfing. Zhang-Kennedy, Chiasson, and Biddle (2011) focused on visualization of password 
cracking techniques through posters and educational comics to train individuals to create strong 
and memorable passwords. The focus of Zhang-Kennedy, Chiasson, and Biddle’s (2011) study 
was to train users for a week and find if this improved knowledge to create stronger passwords to
combat targeted, dictionary, and brute-force attacks.
Using existing literature, we established the following definitions for weak and strong 
passwords. A weak password is (a) a string of less than seven characters; (b) a string comprised 
of only alphabetical or numerical characters; (c) a string, when of mixed characters, has the 
numerical characters at the end of the string only; (d) a string, when of greater than seven 
characters or containing special characters, that is predictable (Yan, et al. 2000; Korkmaz and 
Dalkilic, 2010). Conversely, according to the same research, strong passwords (a) do not include 
any of the weak password characteristics; (b) include one or more numerical, punctuation, and 
uppercase character.
Notoatmodjo and Thomborson (2009) noted that users are the weakest link in controlling and 
maintaining password security. The reason being users are prone to create weak passwords and 
then reuse those potentially weak passwords (Notoatmodjo and Thomborson, 2009). The study 
done by Notoatmodjo and Thomborson (2009) found that almost half of the participants reused a
password in an important account. Komanduri et al (2013) conducted their own study and found 
the same as Notoatmodjo and Thomborson (2009), users create weak passwords. To deal with 
this issue, researchers like Komanduri et al (2013) created telepathwords. These telepathwords 
were intended to discourage individuals from using predictable passwords (Komanduri et al, 
2013).
Related to our study, Stavrou (2017) found that text-based passwords still create problems for 
users, even with the increased amount of password-strength checkers and password policies. 
Stavrou (2017) found that bad password construction practices can lead to weak passwords. 
While our study intended to find if users are able to identify weak or strong passwords, Stavrou 
(2017) created a conceptual architecture to assist users in creating a strong password.
In summary, knowledge of password strength appears to be a problem worth solving, but there 
has not been sufficient research into how individuals identify weak and strong passwords. There 
is a gap in the research that this study may be able to address; understanding of password 
strength based on an individual’s background and experience with technology. 
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Methodology
Broadly, we speculated participants would be able to identify weak passwords consistently. 
Password characteristics such as length, capitalization, inclusion of alphanumeric and symbol 
characters likely serve as significant context clues. Further, we imagined participants would not 
be able to consistently identify strong passwords, particularly when such were intermingled with 
weak passwords of similar length and combination. More technically, the goal of this 
correlational research was to determine which socioeconomic characteristics, if any, have 
measurable interactions with password identification and to what extent any such correlation is 
positive or negative. To facilitate such, we operationalized subject education level, profession, 
and self-reported technical skill as socioeconomic variables on one hand and successful 
identification of weak and strong passwords as password identification variables on the other. 
Further, we imagined a single instrument as a means of collecting data to evaluate our 
hypotheses.
Instrumentation
We designed a single data collection instrument, portioned in three sections. The first section 
implemented a standard informed consent, including opt-out procedures, and required 
affirmation of participation before continuing to the second section. No personally identifiable 
information was collected, and data were coded to participant by a simple integer index ranging 
between 1 and 436. This section also indicated the study was being conducted with IRB approval
and listed relevant IRB contact information should participants have questions or concerns.
Demographic questions were asked in the second section. We asked participants to self-report on
age, gender, profession, technical skill level relative to others they knew, as well as how many 
passwords they used on a daily basis. The first three questions in this section served to collect 
categorical data for our socioeconomic variables. Further, we designed the last question as a 
screening mechanism insofar as we wanted to include only those individuals using at least one 
password daily.
Finally, the third section contained 50 passwords, each associated with a bounded response set of
weak and strong. This facilitated collection of categorical data at the heart of participants’ 
perceptions. Further, the binary nature of the responses directly aligned with current guidance for
digital authentication via passwords (Grassi, Garcia, and Fenton, 2017). The 50 passwords were 
randomly generated in two phases according to standardized definitions of weak and strong 
(Carnavalet and Mannan, 2014; Grassi, Garcia, and Fenton, 2017) in terms of character length, 
character set composition, symbols and so forth. We developed a simple Python program to 
create the password lists, given the standard password strength definitions, for each phase as 
follows.  
Password construction procedure
The first phase generated 100 weak passwords, parameterized as length of one-to-seven 
characters in length, the set of characters bounded to alphanumeric only, and any numerical 
characters positioned at the end of the string. Concurrently, the first phase generated 100 strong 
passwords, parameterized as greater than eight characters, the set of characters bounded to 
alphanumeric, punctuation, and special symbols, and the numeric or symbolic characters 
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randomly placed within the string. The second phase consisted of removing any obvious weak 
(e.g., a single character or short, blatant sequence like 123) and injection of five algorithmically 
weak passwords that may appear strong (e.g., G@m30f7hr0n3$). We then selected every second 
password in each strength category, yielding 25 passwords from each and 50 total.
Participants
To achieve a suitable sample, we started with a robust population framing (essentially, open-
ended) of international users. Because of this, we elected to avoid traditional questionnaire 
instrumentation routes due to the tendency to return poorly sized subject pools. Instead, we opted
to use Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 
By using Mechanical Turk, we were able to solicit individuals from a general, cross-sectional 
population (scoped to Mechanical Turk users and biased towards the subset willing to participate
in a questionnaire-based study) as opposed to a specific profession, age, or education category. 
According to Amazon, Mechanical Turk has a disparate and global user population of more than 
500,000 people from over 190 countries. Further, research (Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis, 
2010) has shown Mechanical Turk to be a strong and reliable platform for crowdsourcing 
participation across a wide spectrum of research modalities. 
Participants earned .50 cents (USD) for completing our web based questionnaire of nine 
demographic data points consisting of: education level, technological skill level, profession, 
ability to perceive a password as either strong or weak, gender, age, number of passwords used 
on a daily basis, the use of a password manager, time per week using an electronic device and 
country in which they resided. Participants then viewed a series of passwords and were asked to 
rate them as either strong or weak.
Sample Description
The final sample size was 436 participants. Whereas the initial sample consisted of 447 
individuals, we removed 11 participants from the data who did not complete the questionnaire 
entirely. We did not provide participants with any instructional information regarding password 
strength. While not controlled for, we did ask participants to avoid (a) searching for password 
strength definitions; (b) utilize tools such as password strength checkers; (c) or any form of 
outside help. That said, we recognize a limitation in our protocol exists insofar as we did not 
control for any of these behaviors.
The sample was demographically distributed across six categories when considering age (Figure 
1). The majority of participants reported an age of between 25 and 34 years (N=205). The largest
age group potentially speaks to the number of individuals who are familiar with technology in 
general and willing to participate in an online survey of this type. The next largest age range was 
35-44 (102), which when combined with the 25-34 group, encompassed 300 of the total group. 
Only two participants were under the age of 18, making them members of a potentially 
vulnerable population. This will be addressed in the section below.
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Figure 1. Number of participants distributed by age demographic
Furthermore, the sample demonstrated a robust spread across age categories according to gender 
(Figure 2). Although the majority of participants belonged to the 25-34 age bracket (46%), 
sufficient distribution across other age demographics existed to be representative. Moreover, our 
demographics reflect external statistics regarding average age of computer users in the U.S. 
(Anderson, 2015). An important note regarding the two participants self-reporting an age as 
Under 18: our IRB review included the potential for protected category participants. Given the 
anonymity of both our instrumentation and Mechanical Turk, the risk for harm to respondents 
was evaluated as minimal.
Figure 2. Number of participants distributed by age and gender demographics
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Level of education was another socioeconomic characteristic we captured (Figure 3). We offered
the nine categories for participants to offer education level. As shown in the table below, we 
found the 202 participants had received an undergraduate degree, which was double the amount 
who had received a graduate level degree. However, our sample showed a wide range of 
education, which helped to identify patterns related to password identification. It is interesting to 
note that the majority of males and females had received a bachelor’s degree, with the second 
highest category being a master’s or graduate level degree. There were also a higher number of 
males and females which had received some college credits while less had actually received an 
Associates degree. There were only 9 total participants who had received a Doctorate level 
degree.
Figure 3. Frequency of participant self-reported highest level of education completed by gender
As well, we identified 33 profession categories based on similar demographic instrumentation in 
the literature (US census citation). While we did not limit participation by profession in any way,
our aim was to collect a heterogeneous sample as to reasonably present a wide spectrum of user 
perception and ability. The top three professions for females were Homemaker (30), Student 
(17), and a tie for third with Unemployed (13) and Education - College (13). For males, the top 
three professions were IT - Management (53), Student (23), and Telecommunication (21).
Table 1. Participant self-reported profession by gender
Profession F M Profession F M
Homemaker 30 2 IT 1 4
Retired 2 4 IT - Management 12 53
Student 17 23 IT - Executive 4 12
 Unemployed 13 15 Processing 5 4
Agriculture 0 4 Legal 1 0
Arts 12 7 Manufacturing - Electronics 0 1
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Table 1 (continued)
Broadcasting 0 1 Manufacturing - Other 1 1
Education - College 13 20 Military 4 10
Education - K-12 7 2 Mining 0 1
Construction 4 2 Publishing 0 1
Finance 4 8 Real Estate 3 3
Government 8 14 Religious 2 1
Health Care 3 9 Retail 1 0
Hotel & Food Service 11 7 Telecommunication 5 21
Wholesale 1 2 Transportation 4 6
 Scientific 3 6 Utilities 3 8
 Software 5 5
A sample bereft of experience with passwords would not be ideal given our aim to measure 
potential relationships between socioeconomic attributes and identification of weak and strong 
passwords. Thus, we asked participants to report on the number of passwords used on a daily 
basis (Figure 4). We found a majority of participants used between one and five passwords daily 
(65%) whereas a stark minority used more than 11 passwords daily (5%).
Figure 4. Daily frequency of passwords used by participants by gender
Lastly, participants self-reported a level of technical skill compared to people they knew (Figure 
5). Combined males and females considered themselves more skilled with a total of 214 total 
participants. In comparison, 113 participants noted they had the same skill as the other people 
they were familiar with. It could be interesting in a later study to find out what subjective or 
objective metrics individuals use to determine they are more adept with technology than others 
around them.
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Figure 5. Frequency of participant self-reported level of technical skill by gender
Hypotheses
Initially, we broadly conjectured participant education, profession, and technical skill would 
show a relationship with successful identification of weak and strong passwords. However, 
accurate measurement of potential relationships would be cumbersome given the multi-level 
structure of our variables. Thus, we opted to disambiguate our general hypothesis into the 
following, more precise and testable constructs.
Table 2. Testable hypotheses according to conjectured variable relationships
Hy Relationships Hypotheses
1 Level of education and weak passwords There is a relationship1
2 Level of education and strong passwords There is a relationship1
3 Profession and weak passwords There is a relationship1
4 Profession and strong passwords There is a relationship1
5 Technical skill level and weak passwords There is a relationship1
6 Technical skill level and strong passwords There is a relationship1
Note. The associated null hypothesis posits a relationship exists. The associated null hypothesis posits no 
relationship exists
Results
Would participant education, profession, or technical skill level be related to successful 
identification of weak and strong passwords? The answers we found were all affirmative except 
for one variable combination. The source for these answers was a sample group of 436 human 
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participants who generated 21,800 discrete trials (number of participants [436] multiplied by the 
number of total password interactions per individual subject [50]). 
We used a Chi-square test of independence to establish whether statistical relationships existed 
per our stated hypotheses with guidance from McDonald (2009). Further, we finished by 
analyzing the nominal strength of the most frequently identified and misidentified passwords 
according to strength. Here, we employed entropy analyses aligned with standardized entropy 
measures per NIST SP 800-63 (Greene et al., 2016). While not associated with our primary 
focus, we felt at least a cursory description using of these results may shed light on participants 
correctly or incorrectly identified passwords as weak and strong. We were aware of efforts to 
develop more precise strength measurements (Bonneau, 2012), however we opted to rely on 
published national standards because of the pervasive reliance of NIST specifications.
Education
We explored education as a potentially related variable first. Here, we hypothesized that 
education would demonstrate a relationship. To test the conjecture, we compared the level of 
education (9 levels) and frequency of correctly and incorrectly identifying both weak and strong 
passwords (Table 3).
Table 3. Frequencies of participant level of education and identification of passwords
Education Weak Correct Weak Incorrect Strong Correct Strong Incorrect
Some High School 14 11 13 12
High School 439 186 305 320
Some College 962 338 644 656
Trade School 257 68 149 176
Associate’s 544 206 374 376
Bachelor’s 3804 1246 2282 2768
Master’s 2011 564 1268 1307
Professional 204 96 157 143
Doctorate 130 95 116 109
The Chi-square test of independence comparing education to successful identification of weak 
passwords (columns two and three in Table 3) revealed the variables to have a significant 
relationship (X2 [8] = 64.89, p value of 5.10E-11  0.05 and a critical value of 15.5). As such, we 
rejected the associated null hypothesis (Table 2: Hy 1). Each group correctly identified weak 
passwords more frequently than incorrectly. The groups which were able to identify weak 
passwords 3 times more often than incorrectly were the individuals with bachelor’s degrees.
For weak password analysis, participants with some high school and individuals at the doctorate 
level identified correct passwords 56% and 57% of the time, respectively. The other education 
levels, High School, Some College, Trade School, Associate’s, Bachelor’s, Master’s, and a form 
of Professional degree, ranged from 68% to 79% able to correctly identify weak passwords. All 
education levels were able to correctly spot weak passwords 70% of the time. While it is 
interesting that the least amount of education (some high school), and most (Doctorate), had the 
lowest average, the overall average displayed the ability for participants to find the weak 
password.
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The second step compared education to successful identification of strong passwords (columns 
four and five in Table 3). Here as well we found a significant relationship between variables (X2
 [8] = 33.71, p value of 4.58002E-05 0.05 and a critical value of 15.5). Thus, we rejected the null
hypothesis (Table 2: Hy 2) as well.
Overall, all education levels were within an 8-point percentage variance, between 45 and 52%, 
able to spot a strong password. The groups with the highest scores of 52% were Some High 
School and Professional degrees, with a Doctorate level education missing by one point at 51%. 
Average ability to spot a strong password was at 49%, showing a major decline in ability to spot 
a strong password. Each group of education level was able to spot a weak password than a strong
password more often.
Table 4. Frequencies of participant profession and identification of passwords
Education Wk. Correct Wk. Incorrect Str. Correct Str. Incorrect
Homemaker 654 46 402 498
Retired 101 6 78 115
Student 715 74 486 725
Unemployed 498 51 341 510
Agriculture 98 11 45 46
Arts 315 16 250 369
Broadcasting 10 0 14 26
Education - College 575 59 403 613
Education - K-12 200 34 92 124
Construction 124 15 69 92
Finance 178 8 160 254
Government 412 50 258 380
Health Care 219 11 157 213
Hotel & Food 346 19 233 302
Info. Technology 114 6 64 66
Info. Technology Mgmt 1377 138 772 963
Info. Technology Exec 318 31 193 258
Processing 158 14 112 166
Legal 8 0 14 28
Manufacturing - Electronics 16 14 0 20
Manufacturing - Other 29 3 25 43
Military 261 30 166 243
Mining 27 0 14 9
Publishing 15 0 14 21
Real Estate 99 2 82 117
Religious 51 20 22 57
Retail 8 0 14 28
Scientific 162 26 100 162
Software 228 22 118 132
Telecommunications 605 57 307 331
Transportation 164 11 129 196
Utilities 217 17 137 179
Wholesale 63 5 37 45
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Profession
The second variable we evaluated for a relationship was participants’ self-reported profession. 
Here, again, we hypothesized that the variable would exhibit a relationship. To analyze the 
possible relationship, we examined the frequency at which 33 profession categories correctly or 
incorrectly identified weak and strong passwords. 
Profession exhibited a significant relationship with identifying weak passwords (X2 [32] = 
153.19, p value of 0.00  0.05 and a critical value of 46.19). Consequently, we rejected the null 
hypothesis (Table 2: Hy 3).
The only professions to demonstrate less than 80% accuracy in identifying weak passwords were
Manufacturing - Electrical (53%) and Religious (71%). The professions which were able to 
identify with between 80 and 89% were Agriculture, Education-K-12, Construction, 
Government, and Scientific. All other categories of professions were able to correctly find weak 
passwords over 90% of the time. Lastly, the professions which were able to correctly identify 
weak passwords 100% of the time were Broadcasting, Legal, Mining, Publishing, and Retail. Of 
all professions, the average score for finding weak passwords was 90%.
We also evaluated participants’ profession against identification of strong passwords. We 
rejected the null hypothesis (Table 2: Hy 4) for this variable as well based on the Chi-square test 
of independence results (X2 [32] = 66.11, p value of 0.0003  0.05 and a critical value of 46.19).
Strong passwords saw a much lower result from weak passwords, with an average of all 
professions only able to identify them 40% of the time. The professions with scores lower than 
40% were Broadcasting, Education-College, Finance, Legal, Manufacturing - Other, Religious, 
and Transportation. This was interesting because both Broadcasting and Legal professions found 
the weak passwords 100% of the time. The only group which was not able to identify any strong 
passwords was Manufacturing - Electrical, which showed this group had the lowest identification
for both weak and strong passwords combined. The group with the highest overall identification 
rate of 60% was Mining.
Technical Skill
We evaluated participant technical skill as the third and final variable. As before, we 
hypothesized technical skill, even self-reported technical skill, would exhibit a relationship with 
identifying weak and strong passwords. We examined the potential relationship according to four
skill categories as follows.
Table 5. Frequencies of participant technical skill and identification of passwords
Technical Skill Wk. Correct Wk. Incorrect Str. Correct Str. Incorrect
Much less skilled 16 6 8 20
Less skilled 355 23 271 401
Same skill 2119 201 1367 1913
More skill 4097 411 2585 3607
Much more skilled 1778 155 1077 1390
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The Chi-square test of independence comparing self-reported technical skill to successful 
identification of weak passwords demonstrated a significant relationship (X2 [4] = 14.95, p value
of 0.005  0.05 and a critical value of 9.5). As such, we rejected the associated null hypothesis 
(Table 2: Hy 5).
Overall it seemed that the participants were able to accurately depict technical skill level when it 
came to perceiving weak passwords. The group which self-reported as much less skilled than 
their counterparts averaged 72% when identifying weak passwords. The less skilled group up to 
the much more skilled group averaged 91% ability to identify weak passwords. Of all the groups,
participants averaged an 87% ability to find weak passwords correctly. While significantly, this 
is a poorer performance compared to the relationship between profession and password strength 
perception.
Finally, we compared technical skill to successful identification of strong passwords. Unlike with
previous tests, we found no relationship between these variables (X2 [4] = 5.93, p value of 0.205 
0.05 and a critical value of 9.5) and therefore accepted the null hypothesis (Table 2: Hy 6). This 
was a surprising result to say the least and warrants deeper investigation.
Password inferences
After completing the Chi-square tests for independence, we wanted to more closely examine 
details associated with passwords used in the instrument (Figure 6). The goal was to develop a 
richer inference of what participants perceived based on their weak or strong selections and the 
entropy of associated passwords. We offer only descriptive analysis here of associations between
data points; there was no attempt to infer causation.
Figure 6. Trend of incorrect perception of password strength as entropy in string rises
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To begin, the most common incorrect selection was for the string G@m30f7hr0n3$. Four 
hundred participants incorrectly perceived this to be a weak password compared to 36 that 
correctly identified this as a strong password. In reality, the entropy for the string is 59.2. 
Conversely, the most common correct selection was a tie between the string 
1FcgiEF46Xy06jVS1 and qwerty. The former was a strong password whereas the latter was a 
weak password, and both were identified by 415 participants as such. The entropy of the two 
strings was 81.6 for the strong password and 19.9 for the weak.
The biggest misconception for users was about strong passwords; overall, participants had a 
harder time identifying strong passwords. It would be interesting to find out why one password 
G@m30f7hr0n3$ was misidentified so frequently as a weak password. Further, if users felt this 
was such a weak password, why did they correctly identify 1FcgiEF46Xy06jVS1 as a strong 
password? We speculate that leetspeak may have signaled an equivalence to a corresponding 
plain text string.
Conclusions
The purpose of this work was to measure to what extent participant education, profession, or 
technical skill level are related to successful identification of weak and strong passwords. 
Towards this goal, we asked 436 human participants to judge whether 50 passwords were weak 
or strong. After data collection, we ran descriptive statistics so as to establish essential features 
and summaries for the sample. We then proceeded with a Chi-square test for independence to 
measure possible relationships between variables and evaluate our hypotheses which are 
summarized as follows (Table 6).
Table 6. Summary of hypothesis testing results
Hy Relationships Results
1 Level of education and weak passwords There is a relationship
2 Level of education and strong passwords There is a relationship
3 Profession and weak passwords There is a relationship
4 Profession and strong passwords There is a relationship
5 Technical skill level and weak passwords There is a relationship
6 Technical skill level and strong passwords There is no relationship
Education was significantly related to successful identification of weak and strong passwords 
alike. Further, each individual educational strata demonstrated higher frequencies of correct 
identification than incorrect. Based on these results, we can infer perception of what constitutes a
weak or strong password are not confined to any one educational stratum. While there could be 
benefit in more granular study here, we feel the results are robust enough to stand alone.
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Profession was significantly related to successful identification of weak and strong passwords 
too. However, here we begin to see individual profession strata incorrectly identify password 
strength more often than correctly. While a stratum like Homemaker or Retired may not surprise 
anyone, the three Information Technology strata all more frequently misidentified strong 
passwords which is surprising to us. The inclusion of a variety of professions gave us enough of 
a range to see how each industry would perceive passwords. It is possible with an even larger set 
of professions to choose from, we could see a difference in password cognition.
There are a variety of follow up questions to be explored within the coupling of profession and 
perception of password strength. Experimental follow up may be of future interest to uncover 
what precisely causes specific professions to correctly identify weak passwords but incorrectly 
identify strong passwords. For a future study, we could focus specifically on individuals in IT 
fields, but target systems administrators, database administrators, and the like.
Interestingly, self-reported technical skill was significantly related to identifying weak passwords
but not related to strong passwords. We are left to wonder about the potential underlying factors 
contributing to this situation and emphatically suggest follow up research in this area. Because 
we observed some trending towards incorrect identification of strong passwords in various 
professions (e.g., Information Technology), we must wonder if such professions inherently 
harbor mentalities associated with incorrectly identifying strong passwords. That stated, we 
suggest any future work with technical skill not rely on self-reporting. Such study could robustly 
establish technical skills through empirical instrumentation.
Future work
Future work on this topic could proceed in several directions. Based on our findings, we 
recommend additional qualitative study to provide further understanding of why individuals are 
not as capable of identifying strong passwords versus weak passwords. Interviewing participants 
with the aim of identifying how they determine password strength could give clarity to the 
results of this study. Furthermore, the results of this study may be useful in creating better 
training for users. Perhaps such training could adopt a gamified or games-based learning 
approach to reinforce patterns of relative password strength. Additionally, research should 
continue to probe why users use comparatively weak passwords despite evidence suggesting they
perceive password strength. There exists a possibility that what users report as a perception of 
weak or strong does not match what they phenomenally experience when interacting with 
passwords. Here, brain-machine interface technology may be useful to design objective probing 
of what is inherently subjective.
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